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Abstract 
Africa continues to show high economic growth and market potential in terms of access 
to natural resources and new consumers, Korea needs to start thinking about 
strengthening its engagement with Africa. Unlike Korea, Portugal has been a strong trade 
partner of Africa, particularly through its investments in two of the fastest growing 
economies in the continent, Angola and Mozambique. Historical, political, economic, 
educational, and cultural ties as well as language have played a crucial role in nurturing 
trade relations. The current economic and financial crisis in the European Union is 
pushing Portuguese companies to strengthen their presence in booming Portuguese-
speaking African countries. Due to Korea’s weak links with the continent, this paper will 
attempt to critically analyse the opportunities and challenges for Korean businesses in 
building partnerships with Portuguese companies to enhance their entry into fast-growing 
African markets. The paper will focus on Mozambique as a case study.  
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
Africa is now, as The Economist recently put it, the “hopeful continent”. With remarkable 
economic output since 2000 - annual average growth close to 5 percent, improved trade 
revenues, reduced macroeconomic imbalances, stronger consumer markets and enhanced 
business productivity, Africa is attracting the attention of many markets and investors. 
The Republic of Korea is a latecomer development aid and trade partner of the African 
continent. The Korea Africa Forum for Economic Cooperation (KOAFEC) is the main 
instrument through which Korea is building cooperation ties with Africa. It includes both 
overseas development aid (ODA) and economic cooperation programmes that are 
implemented via Action Plans approved during these forums. Africa is now Korea´s 
second largest recipient of ODA. Yet, Africa remains a marginal trade partner for Korea. 
As the continent continues to show high economic growth and market potential in terms 
of access to natural resources and new consumers, Korea needs to start thinking about 
strengthening its engagement with Africa. Unlike Korea, Portugal has been a strong trade 
partner of Africa, particularly through its investments in two of the fastest growing 
economies in the continent, Angola and Mozambique. Historical, political, economic, 
educational, and cultural ties as well as language have played a crucial role in nurturing 
trade relations. The current economic and financial crisis in the European Union is 
pushing Portuguese companies to strengthen their presence in booming Portuguese-
speaking African countries. Due to Korea’s weak links with the continent, this paper will 
attempt to critically analyse the opportunities and challenges for Korean businesses in 
building partnerships with Portuguese companies to enhance their entry into fast-growing 
African markets. The paper will focus on Mozambique as a case study.  
 
 
 
2. FROM “HOPELESS” TO “HOPEFUL” CONTINENT: THE RISE OF SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA   
During the second half of the 20th century, Sub-Saharan Africa´s path to liberation and 
independence from colonial domination brought a new sense of confidence and political 
will to foster economic and social progress to the continent´s nations. But the collective 
aspirations of Sub-Sahara African populations for better lives would soon be challenged 
by the violence and disorder brought by domestic conflicts, border disputes and Cold 
War-related power games in the region. As most of the region descended into crisis, it 
became increasingly difficult to address weak governance, state-building dilemmas as 
well as fragilities in political, economic and social policy that were not unusual to newly 
independent nations. By submitting to conditions of becoming beneficiaries of external 
                                                          
1 This working paper is the result of a one-month stay in Seoul (January, 2013) under the invitation of the Korea 
Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP). It was originally published in the 2013 KIEP Visiting Scholar 
Paper Series. 
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aid many of the region´s nations, while politically independent, lost much of their 
economic autonomy and capacity to define their own development. 
However, since 2000, and despite the slow rate of reduction in poverty and inequality 
reductions, Sub-Sahara African countries have achieved remarkable results 
economically: annual average growth close to 5 per cent, improved trade revenues, 
reduced macroeconomic imbalances, stronger consumer markets and enhanced business 
productivity. This contrasts with a disappointing performance between 1960 and 2000: 
low growth rates, decreasing real incomes and productivity, diminishing capital inflows 
and a decreased share of the world exports. The transformation from a “hopeless” 
continent to a “hopeful” Africa is the latest mantra of multilateral organisations such as 
the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, global banks, leading think tanks, 
consultancy firms and media.  
 
2.1.  Sub-Sahara African Economic and Development Trends: The Debate 
Sub-Saharan Africa has managed to escape the slowdown of the global economy and 
economic growth in the region continued to be strong at 4.6% in 2012. The estimates for 
the region are even better for the coming years with economic growth expected to average 
5 per cent over the period of 2013-2015 (World Bank, 2013). Growth in 2012 was helped 
mainly by robust domestic demand, increasing remittance and foreign capital flows, high 
commodity prices and enhanced export volumes (World Bank, 2013). 
Consumer spending has grown rapidly in recent years, supported by real per capita 
income growth of an average 2.3 per cent for the past decade. Consequently, as of 2012, 
21 Sub-Saharan African countries began to be classified as middle-income economies, 
compared to only nine a decade ago (World Bank, 2013). In the World Bank´s definition, 
a country classifies as a middle-income economy (or MIC) when it crosses the USD 1000 
GDP per capita threshold (Fengler & Devarajan, 2012). The MIC status does not mean 
that the country stopped having high levels of poverty and low human development 
indicators but it opens up membership in a club of countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Brazil or China that have access to financial resources from global capital 
markets. This economic tendency has already offered new perspectives on African 
markets with the emergence of a debate on an African middle class or the rise of the 
African consumer. In April 2011, the African Development Bank (AfDB) published a 
market brief entitled “The Middle of the Pyramid: Dynamics of the Middle Class in 
Africa” (AfDB, 2011). The brief presented the results of a study undertaken by the 
multilateral institution revealing that by 2010, the African middle class had risen to 34.3% 
of the population – nearly 326 million people – up from about 115 million or 26.2 per 
cent in 1980, 157 million or 27 per cent in 1990 and 204 million or 27.2 per cent in 2000 
(AfDB, 2011). But the study also made it clear that among the three sub-types it defined 
as“middle class”, the one at the bottom could easily fall into poverty again. These latter 
ranks are also called the floating class, i.e., a middle-class sub-category with per capita 
consumption levels of between USD 2-4 per day and that remain vulnerable to slipping 
back to poverty in case of some exogenous shocks; it represents about 216 million people. 
Using a stricter definition of middle class by considering a minimum threshold of USD 4 
per day would put the continent´s middle class at about 138 million people. The study 
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also showed that the majority of the African middle class is likely to obtain its income 
from salaried jobs or small business rather than from agricultural and rural economic 
activities. Finally, the authors noted that the growth of the middle class in the continent 
contributed to the growing domestic consumption in many African countries. This is 
widely expected to nurture local private sector growth as “a key source of effective 
demands for goods and services supplied by private sector entities” (AfDB, 2011). They, 
however, also stressed that income inequality continued to be very high with about only 
100,000 Africans holding a net worth of USD 800 billion in 2008 (about 80% of the total 
for Sub-Saharan Africa). 
The private sector seems to have noticed these changing social patterns in Africa, with 
McKinsey Company launching a report in October 2012 titled “The rise of the African 
consumer” (McKinsey & Company, 2012). For David Fine, the director of McKinsey & 
Company and who leads McKinsey´s office in South Africa, “the continent´s consumer 
industries are expected to grow a further USD 410 billion by 2020 –more than half the 
total revenue increase that all businesses are expected to generate in Africa by the end of 
the decade” (Fine, 2012). The World Bank points out in its Global Economic Prospects 
of January 2013 that although consumer data for most of Sub-Saharan Africa is scarce, 
available indicators point out strong consumer demand in the region supported by better 
access to credit, decreasing inflation rates and lower interest rates, higher rural income 
due to weather conditions and robust remittance flows (World Bank, 2013). 
The strength of domestic demand is expected to be supported further by the growth of 
remittances (to reach about USD 27 billion by 2014) and investments in infra-structures 
(through new external sources of finance) that will increase productive capacity 
(Chuhan-Pole, Angwafro, Buitano, Dennis, Korman & Sanoh, 2012). Export growth 
was relatively strong in 2012 and it was supported by earlier export investments and 
diversification of trade partners beyond Europe and the US to include Asian countries , 
in particular (World Bank, 2013). Additionally, the value of the exports increased due 
to high commodity prices.  
But this narrative of success is not without a competing view that states that Africa´s 
growth is a mere product of high commodity prices with African exports highly 
concentrated in primary commodities. The share of the manufacturing sector has not 
increased and as Rick Rowden stresses “the bulk of African countries are either 
stagnating or moving backwards when it comes to industrialization” (Rowden, 2013). 
Despite improvements since 2000, the continent, as whole, continues to deliver the 
lowest human development indicators in the world. The last Africa Human 
Development Report 2012 shows how the continent, with ample agricultural land, 
plenty of water and good climate to grow food, is failing to feed its population with one 
in four Africans undernourished and food insecurity remaining an issue: “the spectre of 
famine, which has virtually disappeared elsewhere in the world, continues to haunt parts 
of Sub-Saharan Africa. Famines grab headlines, but chronic food insecurity and 
malnutrition are more insidious, often silent, daily calamities for millions of 
Africans”(UNDP, 2012). Corruption remains rampant in many African countries as 
highlighted every year by the Corruption Perceptions Index released by Transparency 
International (Transparency International, 2012). 
Shantayanan Devarajan and Wolfgang Fengler, leading economists from the World Bank, 
have tried to explain these diverging views of an Africa that is simultaneously growing 
fast and reducing poverty gradually but failing to create jobs, invest in infrastructure and 
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human capital. They point out that: “the growth and poverty reduction of the last decade 
were the result of improvements in the macroeconomic policy environment and political 
stability. The remaining challenges of infrastructure, employment and human 
development also have their roots in weak policies and institutions – what we call 
“government failures””(Devarajan & Fengler, 2012). Devarajan and Fengler argue that 
despite these government failures, there are signs that allow us to maintain an optimistic 
view of the future of Africa, resulting from deep changes in African societies. The authors 
claim that democratization, demographic changes, rapid urbanisation, higher levels of 
education and the widespread use of cell phones opening more areas to free information 
sharing have had an impact on the African policymaking process (Devarajan & Fengler, 
2012). Finally, Morten Jerven from Simon Fraser University writing in This is Africa, a 
sister publication of The Financial Times, argues that African GDP statistics “tell us less 
than we would like to think about income, poverty and growth”(Jerven, 2012). He 
provides the example of Ghana that became overnight a middle-income country in 2010 
after the country´s Statistical Services revised its GDP estimates upwards by over 60% 
suggesting that about USD 13 billion of economic activities had been previously missed. 
The reason rested in the fact that 1993 was the previous baseline data used to measure 
Ghana´s economic growth. Since this year, the structure of the economy has transformed 
rapidly with the introduction of new technologies, the continued liberalisation of the 
economy and emergence of a thriving private sector. 
As Richard Dowden, the well-known Director of the Royal African Society states: 
“Africa- as I have always thought – is a lot richer than is generally assumed. However, at 
the bottom of the pyramid, people can become vulnerable quite quickly especially when 
there is war. So expect to see those horrifying pictures of starving children from time to 
time as well as lots of cool young Africans in fashionable clothes driving flashy cars. 
Both are real. Both are Africa (Dowden, 2013).” 
 
 
 
3. GO AFRICA? KOREA´S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE EMERGING CONTINENT  
 
As with other so-called late-comers to Africa, Korea has also sought to build ties with the 
continent in the past years. The Korea Africa Forum for Economic Cooperation 
(KOAFEC) is the main instrument through which Korea is building cooperation ties with 
Africa. It includes both development aid and economic cooperation programmes that are 
implemented via Action Plans approved during these forums (KOAFEC, 2013). The first 
KOAFEC was held in 2006, followed by two others in 2008 and 2010. They were all 
hosted in Korea. The Korean International Co-operation Agency (KOICA) is the 
country’s agency in charge of implementing its bilateral aid grants and technical 
cooperation policies, with focus on: education, health, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, 
ICT, industry and energy, the environment, disaster relief, climate change and MDGs. As 
the most recent member (24th) of the OECD/DAC, Korea is now a donor country. 
Regarded as the main institutional arrangement by traditional donor countries, the DAC 
conducts research on best practices and themes of interest for aid effectiveness and 
reviews its member´s development cooperation programs approximately every four years. 
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Africa, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa, is the second largest and one of the fastest 
growing recipients of Korean ODA. Its share has sharply increased since 2005, from 
around 1% in 2004 to 19.1% in 2009, with a total of USD 53.31 million (KOICA, 2013).  
Additionally, at the last KOAFEC, the Korean government announced that Seoul intended 
to increase the Economic Development and Cooperation Fund (EDCF) administered by 
the Korea Export-Import Bank (Korea Eximbank) almost twofold to USD 1.1 billion by 
2015, compared to USD 590 million for the period 2005-2009 (Kang, 2011). A recent 
report from the Standard Bank of South Africa has showed that Korea has succeeded in 
tapping into the growing African consumer markets (Freemantle & Stevens, 2012). Since 
2008, Korea (+48%), India (+45%) and China (+38%), along with Malaysia, have been 
the leaders in consumer imports into Africa. In contrast, the major European economies 
have struggled to compete with the new Asian competitors in the African market: Italy (-
14.2%), Spain (-3.3%), Germany (-2.3%) and the U.K (-2.2%) have all lost consumer 
market share since 2008. Among the exceptions among European economies that have 
managed to increase their share of African consumer markets are the Netherlands (7%) 
and Portugal (8%). 
Sub-Saharan Africa remains a marginal trade partner for Korea. Though having an 
economy that has already succeed in surpassing the USD 1 trillion trade mark in 2011, 
Korea´s volume of trade with Africa was only slightly over USD 15 billion in 2012 
(KITA, 2013, Kim, 2011). While Korea imports essentially primary commodities from 
Africa, its exports to Africa are dominated by machinery and transport equipment, 
manufactured goods and chemical products. In 2012, Korea´s exports to Africa were 
concentrated in three main countries: Liberia, South Africa and Nigeria (KITA, 2013). 
Liberia´s large share of trade with Korea results from vessels registered in that country 
but not owned by Liberians (Kang, 2011). Imports from Africa in 2012 were led by South 
Africa, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea (KITA, 2013). 
In face of the current economic scenario for the African continent, Korea cannot shy away 
from building stronger ties with the continent as it would mean not only access to an 
important supply of natural resources but also new business deals in a booming 
infrastructure drive and a new consumer market totalling hundreds of millions. While 
lacking the capacity to fully engage all 53 African countries, Korea could focus on a 
particular set of countries. Despite weak trade relations, one of those countries could be 
Mozambique (KITA, 2013).  The best argument lay in the fact that this is the country in 
which Korea achieved one of its greatest successes overseas in terms of access to natural 
resources: the discovery of offshore natural gas. The opportunities are many but the 
challenges are also many. 
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4. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MOZAMBICAN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT    
Mozambique is usually regarded by donor countries as one of the few successes in Africa 
with a story of peace, political stability and economic growth since the conclusion of the 
General Peace Agreement and the ending of its civil war in 1992. It is also the only 
country among the fastest growing African economies, where there has been political 
leadership transitions over the past 20 years without negatively affecting the country´s 
economic growth, unlike most of Sub-Sahara African countries.; This political leadership 
transition occurred, however, under the continuing dominance of the liberation party 
Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) since the independence from Portugal 
in 1975.. Consequently, donors, in particular European countries, have provided 
significant financial aid resources to support the country´s economic, social and political 
performance (de Renzio & Hanlon, 2007).  
The country remains highly dependent on foreign aid but is considered as a model by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), having consistently met most 
donor demands. In the past, the international donor community has helped Mozambique 
to adopt one of the most detailed budget support initiatives, with annual aid flows 
averaging almost a quarter of its annual gross national income and direct budget support 
accounting for more than half (51.4%) of the national budget until 2010. Budget support 
is a leading development aid innovation to finance the recipient country´s economic and 
social reforms through the transfer of financial resources from donor countries to the 
recipient´s national budget. The financial resources that are transferred are managed in 
accordance with the recipient country´s budgetary procedures. This is different from what 
has been the dominant development aid practice of financing specific programmes or 
projects.  However, since 2010, the national budget has begun to be financed by growing 
domestic revenues derived mainly from the exploration of natural resources and the 
donor´s share of the budget has fallen significantly to 39.6% in 2012 and is projected to 
drop further to 33% in 2013 (Malin, 2012). 
According to the African Economic Outlook 2012, the country´s GDP real growth rate 
reached 7.2% in 2011 as a result of the first overseas export of coal from the first mega 
coal mining projects in the province of Tete together with a strong performance in the 
financial services sector, transport, communications and construction (African 
Development Bank, OECD, UNDP & UNECA, 2012). Private sector investment 
surpassed USD 1.9 billion in 2011 and a total of 30,000 jobs were created by 285 new 
projects. In 2012 and 2013, economic growth is expected to hit 7.5% and 7.9%, 
respectively,  as new foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly in extractive industries, 
continue to enter the country. Strong investments have also been welcomed in the 
agricultural sector and for infrastructure-building. The boom in infrastructure-building is 
centred around the country´s 3 main logistic corridors (Maputo, Beira and Nacala) with 
the cement industry expected to triple production by 2013. Five new companies (the 
Chinese Africa Great Wall Cement Manufacturer, China International Fund, GS cimento, 
and Bill Wood and the South African Pretoria Portland Cement) are to enter the market 
with an expected overall investment of USD 450 million (African Development Bank, 
OECD, UNDP & UNECA, 2012).  
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The most relevant economic development and news of 2011, however, was the discovery 
in September of extensive off-shore natural gas reserves in the Rovuma Bay in the 
province of Cabo Delgado, northern Mozambique. The estimates for cumulative natural 
gas reserves, if proven correct, will position Mozambique in the 4th place in the world in 
terms of natural gas reserves behind Russia, Iran and Qatar. Due to expectations 
concerning the reserves, a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant is to be built in Mozambique. 
During the last decade, Mozambique achieved an average 7.2% GDP growth to make it 
one of the fast growing economies in the African continent (African Development Bank, 
OECD, UNDP & UNECA, 2012). 
The most recent IMF Fifth Review Under the Policy Support of Mozambique released 
in early January 2013 states that: “Economic growth remained buoyant and 
macroeconomic stability was maintained, building on a track record of strong 
macroeconomic policies that effectively supported growth while bringing down 
inflation and strengthening international reserves” (IMF, 2013). The growing 
international confidence in the economic conditions of Mozambique, in particular for 
2013, has been further highlighted by Fitch Ratings that has placed the country in a 
positive outlook leading to a possible sovereign rating upgrade.  Yet, to win the upgrade 
Mozambique would have to improve physical and social infrastructure while keeping a 
prudent fiscal policy (Whitehead, 2012). 
 
 
a. The Paradox of Mozambican Rapid Economic Growth: Low Human 
Development Indicators 
At the same time, while growing rapidly during the last decade, Mozambique´s growth 
rates have been largely driven by a few enclaves and strong capital-intensive mega 
projects in the extractive industries that have not had a relevant impact in terms of job 
creation, better distribution of economic wealth or poverty reduction. The statistical 
growth of manufacturing as a share of GDP is essentially due to MOZAL´s output, the 
country´s largest aluminium producer.  Getting a formal job in Mozambique continues 
to be difficult and the estimated annual entrance of 300,000 new job-seekers in the 
labour market poses difficult challenges for the government. Overall unemployment 
rate stands at 27% and formal jobs are mostly in the cities and accounts only for 32% 
of all employment. In consequence, new job-seekers tend to enter the urban and rural 
informal economy, with little opportunity to find stable employment (de Paepe, 2012). 
While unemployment remains high in the country, there have been significant 
improvements in terms of human and social development. The Human Development 
Report 2011 “Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All” shows that from 1990 
to 2011, the value of Mozambique´s Human Development Indicators (HDI) increased 
from 0.200 to 0.322, an average annual increase of 2.28%. These figures are higher than 
the average for Sub-Saharan Africa in the same period (0.90%) as well as low human 
development countries (1.31%).  From 2000 to 2011, the average annual increase in 
HDI value grew further to 2.49%. During this period, Mozambique was one of the top 
5 performers in the world. Yet, Mozambique continues to be ranked at the bottom of the 
UNDP index. In 2011, Mozambique ranked 184 of a total of 187 countries in terms of 
HDI (Kring, 2011).  
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As aid flows, which have been crucial to sustaining human and social improvements, 
are expected to decrease in the coming years, the diversification and the strengthening 
of the revenue base, in particular through higher and better taxation of the extractive 
sector, becomes crucial to promoting and sustaining a growth agenda based on the 
creation of jobs and tackling persistent poverty issues. Mozambique  like several other 
African countries in similar conditions, is facing the need to transform its current 
economic model based on the “extractive economy” focused on exports of raw 
commodities; into an economy that raises agricultural productivity along with the 
development of new, labour-intensive and more productive sectors such as 
manufacturing and agro-business. 
Despite the fact that 60-70% of the Mozambican population live in rural areas and 
depend on agriculture for employment or livelihood, Mozambique’s agricultural 
development has failed to become a driver of poverty reduction despite the 
government’s stated intentions for the past decade. As Cabral, Shankland, Locke and 
Duran point out: “Food insecurity and malnutrition continue to affect the Mozambican 
population and rural poverty has, at best, been marginally reduced, although increasing 
in central regions. Mozambique´s crop output has remained stagnant over the last 
decade. Sorghum and cassava, the main crops produced by the predominant smallholder 
sector, continue to have poorly developed value chains. Productivity remains low across 
the board and most growth recorded by the sector is explained by farmed land 
expansions rather than efficiency gains” (Cabral, Shankland, Locke and Duran, 2012).  
This is even more striking, when in 2010, less than 14% of the 36 million hectares of 
arable land had been farmed, mostly by smallholders, and of these only 2% had been 
irrigated. For Cabral, Shankland, Locke and Duran there is a three-tier causational 
explanation for the current condition of the sector. First, the sector has suffered from 
inadequate technology and extension services, poor infrastructure and absence of 
markets for inputs, services and outputs (for example, even during times of good food 
production, surpluses from rural areas failed to reach potential urban consumers). 
Second, these causes are the result of a series of factors such as the legacy of a civil 
war, ill-fitted public policies, feeble governance, development aid squandering and lack 
of private capital. Finally, politics can be said to be the ultimate explanation for the 
sector´s poor performance as policies have tended to discriminate against the majority 
of smallholders (Cabral, Shankland, Locke and Duran). 
This seems to be particularly evident in the most recent mega agribusiness project in 
the country, ProSavana. Led by Brazil, ProSavana has raised expectations that it could 
answer some of the recurring issues affecting Mozambique´s agricultural sector. The 
project aims at transforming 14 million hectares of the savannah along the country´s 
northern Nacala Corridor into highly productive agricultural land that will be explored 
by large firms and smallholders. Based on the Brazilian experience, the promoters of 
the project claim that smallholders will be supported through locally-fitted technology 
(improved seeds suitable for Mozambican soils) and environmentally-friendly farming 
techniques. Additionally, the smallholders will be able to join an export-oriented 
agriculture value chains through contract farming and the promotion of cooperatives 
(Cabral, Shankland, Locke and Duran, 2012). 
But local leaders from the National Peasant´s Union (UNAC) after meeting in Nampula 
in October 2012 to discuss ProSavana released a declaration stating that they were 
concerned with the lack of information and transparency from the participating 
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governments in the project (Mozambique, Brazil and Japan) as well as the lack of 
involvement of civil society in the process. They also condemned any attempt of land 
resettlement and expropriation to give place to mega agribusiness and arrival of 
Brazilian agribusiness transforming Mozambican farmers into their employees and rural 
workers (UNAC, 2012). 
In addition, another issue that is expected to pose a growing threat to agricultural 
development and productivity in Mozambique is climate change. A 2010 World Bank 
Report entitled “Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change: Mozambique” argues 
that over the coming 40 years, the impact of climate change will lead to a decrease of 
2-4% in yields of major crops, especially in the central region. Combined with frequent 
flooding of rural roads, this could result in an agricultural GDP loss of 4.5% (optimist 
scenario) or 9.8% (pessimist scenario) (The World Bank, 2010). 
 
 
b. From Policy Dependence to Growing Policy Space   
 
The discovery of vast reserves of mineral resources in Mozambique is expected to 
reduce the leverage donor countries have had on the country´s governance. This will 
open an opportunity for the government to gain more policy space, i.e., more autonomy 
in designing and implementing public policies. This has led to a growing debate in the 
country on the role of the state and how to avoid the “resource curse”, a common feature 
in poor but resources-rich developing countries (Hofmann & Souza Martins, 2012). 
Mozambican authorities are now facing the need to enhance their natural resources 
management to guarantee environmentally and intergenerational sustainability. The 
authorities seem to be aware of the paramount need to update and strengthen the legal, 
regulatory and institutional frameworks as the country begins to benefit from the natural 
resources windfall and have to enter into new forms of engagement with the private 
sector, particularly large multinationals.  
The challenges are many as pointed out by the Norwegian Anti-Corruption Resource 
Center U4: “In Mozambique prevalence of corruption remains an area of concern for 
both the public as well as donors, who support almost half of the state’s budget. 
Corruption manifests itself through various forms, including political, petty and grand 
corruption, embezzlement of public funds, and a deeply embedded patronage system. 
Checks and balances are weak, as the executive exercises strong influence over the 
legislative and the judiciary. Corruption also affects several sectors in the country, such 
as the police, public administration, judiciary, and public financial management” (Anti-
Corruption Resources Center U4, 2012). The latest Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index of 2012 ranked Mozambique 123rd out of 174th countries 
(Transparency International, 2012). 
The declaration in October 2012 that Mozambique had become fully compliant with the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) reveals that the country´s 
authorities are making significant steps to address criticisms for failing to offer more 
transparency and accountability on issues related to revenues from the exploration of 
its natural resources (EITI, 2012). But as important as the legal, regulatory and 
institutional framework is the way in which the authorities will engage communities in 
the areas where the exploration of the natural resources will take place in the coming 
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years. The recent conflicts between the Brazilian mining company, Vale do Rio Doce, 
and the resettled villagers from Cateme, in the region of Tete shows that there is still 
much work to be done on this issue (Polgreen, 2012 and Mosca & Selemane, 2011). 
The Mozambique government needs to build the capacity to wisely use the revenues 
from the extractive industries as a platform to diversify the country´s productive base, 
fortify their human capital and ultimately create an internal market. This necessarily 
requires a better holding of the rents derived from natural resources by the authorities 
in order to effect these structural changes over time and reduce the country´s ongoing 
dependency on external financing.  A joint report released on December 2012 by non-
governmental organizations Friends of the Earth Mozambique, Jubilee Debt Campaign 
and Tax Justice Network, with new information in the public domain and released under 
the UK Freedom of Information Act, shows clearly how the single biggest private sector 
project ever made in Mozambique, the Mozal aluminium smelter, pays only 1 percent 
tax on gross revenue from aluminium sales to the Mozambican government. With an 
average revenue of USD 1.2 billion, 1% tax would raise USD 12 million in taxes per 
year.  Mozal pays no tax on profit, or any sales, customs or circulation taxes. The report 
estimates that for every USD 1 paid to the Mozambican government, USD 21 left the 
country in profit or interest to foreign governments and investors (Friends of the Earth 
Mozambique, Jubilee Debt Campaign & Tax Justice Network, 2012).  
Only now does the Mozambican governmentseems to be acting on this issue. The 
current Minister of Finance, Manuel Chang, has confirmed in late December 2012 that 
a governmental technical team will renegotiate the megaproject contracts, in particular 
the tax benefits and other concessions. The megaprojects most likely to be affected are 
Mozal, exploration of natural gas (Sasol), heavy sands (Kenmare) and coal (Rio Tinto 
and Vale do Rio Doce) (Rádio Moçambique, 2012). Mozambique is in a critical juncture 
and ultimately whether or not the country will positively transform its economic 
structure will depend on the role of the state in managing sustainably the windfalls from 
the exploration of the country´s natural resources.  
As Isabelle Ramdoo states: “the new architecture that is setting in place calls for new 
forms of coalition between the Government, the extractive industries and the donor 
community. As much as it is an opportunity for donors to re-think and redefine their 
engagement with Mozambique, it calls for the Government to adopt an inclusive 
approach in order to generate synergies and complementarities with these actors that 
have so far played a crucial role or are expected to do so in the future. On the operational 
side, there has been little coherence and alignment with what the industries attempt to 
do on their side to contribute to development, with what the donors and government 
agree to achieve together at the national or sub-national level, in particular to promote 
transparency and domestic resource mobilization. Mozambique will need to bring all 
its partners to the table to engage constructively on concrete development outcomes if 
it wants to tap into the value added of each partner”(Ramdoo, 2012). 
As important as good policies to nurture the country´s economic growth and 
development is the capacity of the political system to adapt to the rapid changes in the 
economy as a result of the newfound wealth from its natural resources. The ruling party 
FRELIMO is set to remain the dominant political power for the foreseeable future, with 
good organisation and widespread support in the country (Hanlon, 2012). But patronage 
seems to remain relevant in the workings of FRELIMO and government with 
complaints that membership in the party was becoming a requirement for promotion in 
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the civil service, for access to loans, scholarships, housing, licences, etc from 
governmental sources and institutions (Hanlon, 2012). Since 2003 the previous 
tendency following the first multiparty elections in 1994 to separate party and State 
seems to have been reversed with the current Presidency of Armando Guebuza. As Marc 
de Tollenaere stresses: “the split between party and state was seen as the cause of a near 
electoral loss in 1999 and had to be reversed. Guebuza revitalized the party structures 
from top to bottom and made it no secret that the State was the principal instrument to 
reproduce the power of the party”(de Tollenaere, 2012). De Tollenaere highlights that 
membership in the party increased from 1.6 million in 2003 to 3.6 million in 2012. 
Despite some successes of the opposition (like the victory in the municipal elections in 
the country´s second and fourth major cities, Beira and Quelimane, respectively) and 
the high electoral abstention, FRELIMO holds a qualified majority in the parliament, 
controls most of provincial assemblies, governs 41 out of 43 municipalities and won the 
presidency with ¾ of the votes. 
 
 
4.3. The Return of the State? 
 
Since the 1990s, the State has been pushed aside as the country undertook a vast 
programme of privatisations that benefit military and political leaders (Pitcher, 1996). 
This was what Hanlon called the time of “savage capitalism”(Hanlon, 2009). A group 
of new domestic elite business groups, most with strong ties to FRELIMO, has since 
then emerged to play an increasing role in the country´s economy, in particular in 
building the infrastructures and logistics supporting the extractive sector (ports, 
railways, roads and bridges). A good example is Insitec that recently became the 
country´s largest business group with interests in the second largest bank (BCI), the 
northern railway and port system and the company that holds the concession for the 
Mpanda Nkuwa dam. In June 2011, it bought CETA, Mozambique´s largest building 
and engineering company (Hanlon, 2012). The importance of these political-business 
ties in Mozambique and the potential conflict of interests has led the country´s main 
anti-corruption non-governmental organisation, the Centro de Integridade Pública 
(Center for Public Integrity), to start a database on who´s who in the business sector in 
Mozambique (CIP, 2012). De Tollenaere, again, offers an interpretation behind its 
economic rationale: “this produced an economic model that was increasingly driven by 
the need to control access to the national economy and the drive to seek rent. One of the 
characteristics is the preference for large investments and for business that guarantees 
a quick return. FRELIMO old-hands will argue that there was no other option. If not, 
by mere lack of cash when liberalization started, the economy would have been entirely 
in foreign hands. Rent seeking was required to feed the ever-widening network of 
patronage. If not based on ideological conviction, loyalty and allegiance need to be 
bought. The point is not that FRELIMO intentionally tries to keep a majority of the 
Mozambicans poor. The point is rather that there are stronger political incentives than 
poverty reduction that have shaped the political economy of Mozambique and an 
emergent property of that political economy is that it does not produce inclusive 
growth”(de Tollenaere, 2012).  
This may explain why in the latest report on Mozambique (December 2012), the 
Economist Intelligence Unit argues that despite reforms to improve business conditions 
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in the country, progress have been slow “owing largely to political resistance to the 
removal of controls that benefit the state elite”(EIU, 2012). Mozambique continues, in 
fact, to achieve low rankings in international comparisons as shown by the Ease of 
Doing Business and Global Competitiveness Indexes. In the 2013 Ease of Doing 
Business Index, Mozambique came in 146th place out of 185 countries, dropping seven 
places from a year before, and below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (140th place) 
(The World Bank, 2012). In the Global Competitiveness Index for 2011-2012, 
Mozambique got the 133rd position out of 142 countries. In the previous index, 
Mozambique was in 131st within a group of 139 countries evaluated by the World 
Economic Forum (WEF, 2012). Recent news provide some evidence that under 
President Guebuza, the Mozambican State is trying to reassert, after the period of 
privatisations in the 1990s, its role in economy.  
First, in December 2012, the Mozambique state reacquired through purchase control 
over the Banco Nacional de Investimento or BNI (National Investment Bank) by 
acquiring the 50.5% owned by Portuguese shareholders (Hanlon, Newsletter 2012). The 
bank was originally set in 2010 by the Mozambican and Portuguese governments as a 
development and investment bank. It aimed in particular to finance large projects such 
as Cesul, the new central-south power line and Cahora Bassa north bank power station. 
Portuguese state bank Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD) owned 49.5%, Maputo-based 
Banco Comercial e de Investimentos (BCI), and itself under CGD, owned 1% and the 
remaining 49.5% was held by the Mozambican state´s holding company Instituto de 
Gestão das Participações do Estado (IGEPE)(Lusa, 2012). The President has already 
stated that it intends to transform BNI into a national development and agriculture bank, 
eight years after being rejected by donors (O País, 2012). The country´s Minister of 
Finance, Manuel Chang said that the state-owned BNI would in the future finance 
riskier sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure and development, sectors with more 
difficulties in terms of access to private capital (Hanlon, Newsletter 2012).  
Second, the takeover of BNI reveals a government-led acquisitions drive as it followed 
two other major purchases, the Cahora Bassa dam and Águas de Moçambique 
(Mozambique Waters). The Mozambican state already owned 85% of Cahora Bassa but 
decided to increase its share to 92.5% in 2012 after buying 7.5% to the Portuguese 
government. Águas de Moçambique was also held by the Portuguese Águas de Portugal 
(Portugal Waters) that controlled 73% of the company. In 2011, the Mozambican 
government acquired the control from Águas de Portugal for EUR 6 million. For the 
national newspaper O País, this shows a country where the State continues to be the 
main economic agent and player (O País, 2012). 
Third, President Guebuza in his state of the nation address on 12th December 2012, 
announced that the government had already created the Empresa Nacional de 
Hidrocarbonetos-Logística (National Hydrocarbon Logistics Company) to provide 
services in the natural gas sector. In an interview for the special issue from Great 
Insights on Mozambique, President Guebuza made clear that the Empresa Nacional de 
Hidrocarbonetos-Logística was expected to encourage the private sector in 
Mozambique to develop around the gas sector and that his government would also 
attract foreign investment to invest in the industry in conjunction with domestic firms 
(ECDPM, 2012). A similar company is also soon to be set up for the mining sector, the 
Empresa Moçambicana de Exploração Mineira- Logística e Serviços (Mozambican 
Mining Exploration and Logistics Company) (Hanlon, Newsletter 2012). A new mining 
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law, already approved by the government on 18th December 2012 will require mining 
firms to go through Mozambique-based procurement of goods and services as a way to 
boost the number of contracts gained by Mozambican companies (Hanlon, Newsletter 
2012). The main goal is to ensure that these state-owned companies will deal with 
developing upstream and downstream links to the megaprojects.  
Finally, the signs leading to the enhancement of the role of the state in the economy are 
also patent in its desire to foster stronger social and human development. In its letter of 
intent to the IMF in early December 2012, the Mozambican government vowed to 
accelerate poverty reduction through more inclusive growth with the implementation of 
the country´s Action Plan for Reducing Poverty –PARP (2011-2014). It will be focused 
on three main pillars: 1) enhancement of production and productivity in agriculture 
(aiming at an annual growth of agricultural output by 7 percent to double production by 
2020 through higher productivity and expansion of cultivated land); 2) creation of jobs  
(around 200,000 jobs in the public and private sector each year but with a strong 
emphasis on commercial and industrial sectors) and 3) enhancement of social and 
human development (with improvement of access to, and the quality of, social services 
and infrastructure (IMF, 2012). 
 
 
5. PORTUGAL AS A BUSINESS PARTNER FOR KOREA IN MOZAMBIQUE   
 
Unlike Korea, Portugal has been a prominent trade partner in Africa, particularly through 
its investments in two of the fastest growing African economies for the past 10 years, 
Angola and Mozambique. The country´s ongoing financial woes that coincided with the 
economic crisis in its main market, the European Union, is pushing Portuguese companies 
to enhance their markets, business opportunities in these two countries.  Despite the 
colonial past, political, economic, educational, cultural and linguistic ties continue to play 
a crucial role in nurturing bilateral relations. As Angola is already regarded as a mature 
market for Portuguese companies that have maintained presence there for an extensive 
period, Mozambique has become a target (EUI, 2012). 
In the case of Mozambique, Lisbon and Maputo have established regular bilateral 
summits in 2011 as a way to strengthen the political and institutional ties between the two 
countries. From an economic and trade perspective, bilateral trade has intensified with 
Portugal playing an increasing role as a trade partner of Mozambique. In 2011, Portugal 
was the sixth main supplier for Mozambique accounting for 4.40% of the foreign import 
totals (though its position did not change, its market share increased from 3.85% in 2010) 
and it was the 11th largest Mozambican client representing 1.44% of the latter’s national 
exports (from the 17th position and 1.08% a year before) (AICEP, 2013). The data for 
2012 does not include the position as a trade partner but Portugal exported goods totalling 
EUR 262.5 million, an increase of 36% relative to 2011 while total imported goods were 
valued at EUR 15.447 million, less 59% than a year before. This can probably be 
explained by the strong economic contraction of Portugal following the austerity 
measures (AICEP, 2013). In 2011, more than 2000 Portuguese firms exported to the 
Mozambican market, compared to 1520 in 2010, and they sold mainly machinery and 
equipment, metals, vehicles and other transportation materials, food products, wood pulp 
and paper and chemicals.  
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Portuguese companies are actively involved in the construction sector as Mozambique 
undertakes major infrastructure projects throughout the country. The energy and the 
offshore natural gas exploration are also expected to lead to major Portuguese 
investments. Portugal´s oil and gas company, GALP Energia, will boost its investments 
following the discoveries (with ENI, Korea Gas Corp and Mozambique´s state-owned 
ENH) of natural gas fields in the northern region of the country. Portuguese power grid 
company Redes Energéticas Nacionais (REN) and China State Grid plan to go ahead with 
their first joint venture for the African market precisely in Mozambique. State Grid will 
join the consortium in charge of building the power transmission between Tete and 
Maputo. This project is part of the strategic partnership set during REN´s privatisation in 
which State Grid acquired a 25% stake of the Portuguese firm (Gonçalves, 2012). The 
paper and pulp sector has also attracted the interests of a leading Portuguese company. 
Portugal´s Portucel has won the land rights for approximately 360,000 ha in Mozambique 
and will build an export-oriented paper and pulp factory (Silva, 2010). 
Finally, the country´s economic growth has started to attract flows of Portuguese 
emigrants as they escape lack of jobs in Portugal. According to the Portuguese consulate 
in Maputo, there are 20,000 Portuguese citizens in the country (England, 2011). Since 
registration is not compulsory, the numbers do not offer an accurate picture of the total 
number of Portuguese in Mozambique. However, the Portuguese consul-general, quoted 
by the Financial Times, said that the registrations had increased by about 10 percent in 
the past two years providing an idea of the trend.  This situation has already led the 
Mozambican authorities to announce that they will become stricter with concession of 
visas granted at arrival in the country (Lusa, 2013).  
 
 
5.1. The Potential of Innovative Triangular Business Partnership in 
Mozambique: Korean, Portuguese and Mozambican firms and the Implementation 
of the Action Plan for Reducing Poverty (2011-2014) 
 
In the field of development cooperation, triangular cooperation is a new modality that has 
been gaining international attention: “Triangular cooperation consists mainly of technical 
cooperation aimed at capacity building and takes place mostly in the same region where 
both the emerging donors and beneficiary countries are located. It is often based on 
previous cooperation between traditional and emerging donors, that is considered 
successful and worth transferring to third countries”(Ashoo, 2010).  In its current practice, 
triangular cooperation has not involved the private sector. Yet, its important role in 
driving economic growth and development remains “tangential to mainstream 
development policy and practice”(Davis, 2012).  
For Peter Davis, the private sector can be a strong contributor for development: 
“Companies often have good access to finance and can invest in a scale that others 
cannot: they may have expert skills and knowledge, even the ability to develop their 
own technology, taking advantage of their scale. Because they are interested in market 
growth, they may help to encourage pro-growth policy outcomes and associated 
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governance improvements. They are usually visible to the public and their leaders and 
they may feel, especially when foreign to the country in which they operate, the need 
to behave within moral norms that may be more demanding than legislation requires in 
their treatment of staff, in limiting any environmental harm and in being seen to 
contribute to the common good” (Davis, 2012). The potential to harness the contribution 
of the private sector for a country´s development can be, as Davis points out, optimised 
when there is a “genuinely symbiotic relationship between the actions taken by the state 
and corporate actors”(Davis, 2012). 
Mozambique´s Action Plan for Reducing Poverty for 2011-2014 has offered wider 
opportunities for an innovative triangular business partnership between Korean, 
Portuguese and Mozambican private firms to help the development of two of the 
country´s most important economic sectors needed to tackle poverty and unemployment: 
agriculture and manufacturing. A local partner is fundamental in making the partnership 
work because it will show publicly the commitment to national growth and development 
in a country with a relatively weak private sector.  
The government has put in place PEDSA, the country´s Strategic Agriculture Plan for the 
period 2011-2020, and approved on 3rd May 2011 (PEDSA, 2013). The plan is clearly 
seeking to address the country´s agricultural challenges: 1) low agricultural productivity, 
weak production and competitiveness of the sector; 2) limited access to markets due to 
poor infrastructure and supporting services; 3) land and forests mismanagement; 4) 
fragile institutions and incentives in the operationalization of strategic plans, programs 
and projects for the sector. According to the last agriculture census (2009/2010), there 
were 3.8 million farms in the country but the average farm was only between one and two 
ha, less than four percent of the total farms used fertilizer, only two percent had access to 
credit and around five percent used irrigation (INE, 2011). The PEDSA has 5 main goals: 
1) a cumulative agricultural growth of at least seven percent annually; 2) double the 
agricultural production through productivity increase and expansion of cultivated land; 
3) intensify cattle breeding and genetic improvement; 4) increase the production of 
poultry and 5) sustainable management of natural resources.  While PEDSA gives a much 
more interventionist role to the government as a regulator and facilitator in the country´s 
process of agricultural development it also intends to promote, attract and protect private 
investments in the whole value chain of the sector (PEDSA, 2013). The government is 
expected to: 1) increase expansion of rural extension services and agriculture research; 2) 
provide inputs needed for production and supply (like fertilizers); 3) offer technological 
packages, animal traction and mechanisation; 4) increase access to water, electricity and 
agro-processing; 5) guarantee credit for farmers, traders and suppliers; 6) invest in the 
provision of insurance; 7) expand contract farming and 8) return the country´s marketing 
board, the Mozambique Cereals Institute (Instituto de Cereais de Moçambique) to its role 
of buyer of last resort (Hanlon, 2012). Korean firms, jointly with its Portuguese and 
Mozambican partners, could share technical and technological expertise following the 
country´s successful agricultural development and management within a context 
dominated by small-sized farms. Some major challenges that need to be taken into 
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account in this sector. First, the issue of landgrabs and potential conflict with local 
communities that can easily emerge in mega agribusiness projects such as in the case of 
the Brazilian-Japanese-Mozambican funded ProSavana. And second, the need to 
carefully assess the political and bureaucratic interests of the ruling party in supporting 
de facto productive initiatives in this sector (Buur, Baloi and Tembe, 2012). 
The government is also very interested in building a stronger domestic industry as a way 
to create jobs for the annual 300,000 job-seekers that enter the labour market. Despite the 
low rankings in the latest Ease of Doing Business and Global Competitiveness indexes, 
the Mozambican government continues to show signs that the expansion of the private 
sector, and in particular of export-oriented agro-industrial and labour-intensive industrial 
activities, is fundamental for the country´s future development (Macauhub.com, 2013). 
As with the agricultural sector, the industrial sector is not free from problems. The 
Confederation of Mozambican Business Associations (CTA), together with the National 
Directorate for Studies and Policy Analysis (DNEAP) at the Ministry of Planning and 
Development and the National Statistics Office (INE), conducted an industrial survey 
covering 800 manufacturing SMEs in 7 provinces. While a final paper on this research is 
not available, John Rand and Soren Schou anticipate results (Rand & Schou, 2012). The 
main conclusion is that the most serious constraints to growth in Mozambican 
manufacturing are credit, access to land and corruption. An additional constraint that the 
authors highlight is the absence of skilled workers. Rand and Schou also mention the 
difficulties in expanding an export-oriented manufacturing sector: “Most manufacturers 
source inputs from abroad, and the industrial sector in Mozambique is generally 
characterized by having a relatively low degree of sector linkages. Excluding megaproject 
exports, the contribution of the export sector to the Mozambican economy has been 
modest. The lack of diversity in manufacturing exports therefore raises concern about 
whether potential learning effects from exports (if present) have the necessary conditions 
for “spilling over” to the remaining economy”(Rand & Schou, 2012). 
This analysis opens precisely the opportunity for Korean firms to offer their experiences 
in building, together with Portuguese and Mozambican firms, a successful export-
oriented manufacturing sector; to the Mozambique government. Needless to say, that 
experience required overcoming many international obstacles. At the same time, Korean 
and Portuguese firms can be the vehicles to open markets for Mozambican manufactured 
products in Europe and Asia. For example, Mozambique already exports cotton and 
intends to increase its production under PEDSA. The existence of this abundant raw 
material could easily serve the needs of an infant textile manufacturing sector in 
Mozambique producing for the local, regional and global market. Recently, a consortium 
of Mozambican and Portuguese firms has bought the assets of the textile company 
Riopele in Marracuene (30kms northern Maputo) and that had been inactive for 20 years. 
The new owners, Mozambican Intelec Holdings and Portuguese Mundotextil, Mundifios 
and Crispim Abreu, formed a new company called Mozambique Cotton Manufacturers 
(MCM) and announced an investment of USD 40 million for the next three years to revive 
textile production (Responsify.org, 2012). Also, Ethiopia can be a model for 
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Mozambique. An increasing number of major global retailers such as H&M, Tesco or 
Primark have already started to source textiles and clothing from the country and the 
expansion of the industry has been due to increasing volume of cotton produced in the 
country (Textilesupdate.com, 2012). Finally, on the issue of lack of labour skills, the 
government has invested heavily in the past years in technical and vocational training to 
answer the needs of the market (AfDB, OECD, UNDP and UNECA, 2012). 
This innovative triangular business partnership between Korean, Portuguese and 
Mozambican firms is essentially a “learning-by-doing” initiative. In order to operate 
effectively, a crucial point that needs to be addressed from the beginning is the 
identification of common interests, ethics, business standards and complementarities of 
the business actors involved in the face of particular Mozambican political, economic and 
social context.   
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The challenges for investment in Mozambique are not few, which this paper has tried to 
highlight several times, but the rewards can be plentiful as revealed by the successful 
partnership between ENI (Italy), Galp (Portugal), Korea Gas Corp. (Korea) and state-
owned oil company Empresas Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos ENH in discovering natural 
gas fields in the northern part of the country (oilreviewafrica.com, 2012). Apart from 
natural gas, Mozambique holds other abundant natural resources such as hydroelectric 
energy (that already exports to the region, in particular South Africa), coal, gold, titanium, 
bauxite and other minerals. It is one of the top ten countries with more land available for 
agriculture and its 2500 km coastline is known for the vast sea resources (McKinsey & 
Company, 2011). 
Additionally, it is necessary to look at Mozambique beyond its wealth in natural 
resources. The country is responsible for 70% of goods transits of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). Its three logistic corridors connect neighbouring 
landlocked countries to the world through the deep water coastal ports of Maputo, Beira 
and Nacala. Benefitting from a strategic location in the continent, Mozambique can be 
regarded as a base for entering a regional market (SADC) of 250 million potential 
consumers. SADC has been pushing for further trade and economic liberalisation in the 
sub-region and has put in place a Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP). This plan lays down a roadmap for SADC integration in several steps: a free 
trade area in 2008, a customs union in 2010, a common market by 2015, a monetary union 
by 2016, and an economic union with a single currency in 2018 (Kalenga, 2012). The 
volume of intraregional trade remains low at 19% of GDP but the prospects are positive 
following the consolidation of SADC free trade tariffs which began in 2008 (AfDB, 
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OECD, UNDP and UNECA, 2012). Furthermore, Mozambique enjoys preferential access 
to European markets under the European Union/SADC Economic Partnership Agreement 
signed in 2009 as well as to the US market through AGOA. The adoption of a single 
electronic window “Janela Única Electrónica”, the electronic taxing system “e-
tributação” and other internal electronic applications are expected to ameliorate customs 
performance and trade facilitation. Finally, World Bank´s Fengler states that the country 
is well place to be one of the next middle-income African countries by 2025 if it continues 
on its current economic trajectory. 
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